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2 May 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Intelligence as a Force Multiplier--Meeting with [redacted]
IC Staff Liaison with ASD(C³I), 1 May 1986

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1. I met with [redacted] in his Pentagon office. His initial reaction to the force multiplier study was, "here we go again." He said that his assignment to Secretary Latham's office grew out of a similar activity. He explained that HAC staffer Chuck Snodgrass was responsible for the creation of TIARA in the early 70s--i.e., before the intelligence oversight committees were established. Snodgrass also got the HAC to charge the DCI and SecDef with conducting the 1978 "national-tactical interface" study. The SecDef subsequently "copped out" by preparing a plan for intelligence support to the operating commanders. [redacted] was the DCI representative for the plan. The DoD had only a slight role in its preparation which included an intelligence "Capabilities Handbook" that is prepared by [redacted] and issued annually.

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2. In Europe today just about all "useful" intelligence comes from national systems, especially from the ELINT collectors. Potentially valuable TIARA systems--e.g., the RF4Cs, tactical Sigint, TR-1, and River Joint airborne Elint/Comint--accept tasking from the national side of the house. They can't be effectively exploited without direct linkage with the "national" technical data bases--the latter exist only within the "national community." This arrangement is acceptable to all concerned because "tactical commanders are not smart enough" to task the TIARA systems. [redacted] said that the V US Corps in Frankfurt is a good example of the reliance of a tactical commander on national systems which are the "foundation" of his intelligence support in peacetime. In a full-scale conflict, locally-controlled intelligence assets will replace national systems because the latter are likely to be quickly degraded.

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3. [redacted] said there were areas where additional national assets could be developed for supporting the military. He cited HUMINT as an example. He said that after a visit to Europe two years ago the DCI agreed to the CINCEUR's request for more HUMINT support. The result is an increased emphasis on HUMINT by DIA.

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4. Within the DoD world the DCI has the greatest difficulty with the capabilities (ASD/C) and the programmatic people (PA&E). Both components have no intelligence responsibilities. They handle defense programmatic and budgetary issues across the board. A year ago the Hill forced the constitution of the ASD(C³I) as the successor to the Stillwell operation that had been located within the office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Policy. Donald Latham became "the honorable" and he has three deputies

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(DASDs): intelligence, communications (C³), and plans/resources. He has line supervision over the DCA, DMA, and the Joint Tactical C³ Agency at Fort Monmouth, and staff supervision over DIA and NSA. His intelligence deputy, Charlie Hawkins (the senior career DoD intelligence official), oversees five directorates: national intelligence systems (W. Marquitz),* tactical intelligence systems (R. Engel), intelligence resources, special technical operations (P. Bunsen), and intelligence personnel and training (C. Wilson).

5. "Latham and Hawkins deal with Burkhalter and []" said Baer. There is an "informal" Intelligence Management Coordination Committee chaired by Latham and for which [] functions as the executive secretary even though there are no tasks, minutes, or action officers. A NATO Intelligence Support Steering Group also is chaired by Latham. Admiral Burkhalter sits on this group as the personnel representative of the DCI and not as the D/ICS.

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[] is Burkhalter's representative on its Senior Review Group.** [] also is a member of the Senior Executive Intelligence Planning Council that was established (as part of TIAP) by General Heinz, the EUCOM J-2. It meets twice a year in Stuttgart to review NFIP/TIARA program and budget issues and enables the NFIP world to plug directly into the "tactical arena."

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6. As an aside, [] asked rhetorically, "why is the GDIP a part of the NFIP?" He suggested these as possible answers: a) the GDIP picked up all of the "leftovers" that weren't embraced by the NRP or CCP; b) if the leftovers were given to the services the latter would choose tanks and other hardware at the expense of intelligence capabilities; c) GDIP intelligence support to the U&S command CINCs gives the DCI a window into the various theaters for intelligence support; and d) if everything was TIARA the DCI wouldn't have a "way in."

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7. [] said that he would structure the force multiplier study around "topic areas" and how intelligence assets--TIARA and NFIP--could be brought to bear on them now and "downstream." His only example of a topic area was the European air/land battle.

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*Bobby ETTison is the chief scientist and deputy to Marquitz.

*[] said that he was involved in NATO's BICES effort (Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation Systems) using []. It (was not clear under whose purview--committee, group, council, etc.--this activity is being pursued.

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